Dealing with Deflation in Turbulent Times. Agricultural Markets and Rural Management in Southern Navarre (Spain), 1817-1833 by Lana-Berasain, José-Miguel
 
Histoire & mesure 
XXVI-1 | 2011
Revisiter les crises
Dealing with Deflation in Turbulent Times.
Agricultural Markets and Rural Management in
Southern Navarre (Spain), 1817-1833
Faire face à la déflation en période de turbulence. Marchés agricoles et gestion










Date of publication: 1 July 2011





José-Miguel Lana-Berasain, « Dealing with Deflation in Turbulent Times. Agricultural Markets and
Rural Management in Southern Navarre (Spain), 1817-1833 », Histoire & mesure [Online], XXVI-1 | 2011,
Online since 01 July 2011, connection on 20 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
histoiremesure/4123  ; DOI : 10.4000/histoiremesure.4123 
© Éditions de l’EHESS
Histoire & Mesure, 2011, XXVI-1, p. 75-104
75
 José-Miguel Lana-Berasain*
Dealing with Delation in Turbulent Times.Agricultural 
Markets and Rural Management 
in Southern Navarre (Spain), 1817-1833**
Abstract. The aim of this article is to identify common traits and local peculiarities 
in the widespread agricultural crises which were unleashed after the end of the Napo-
leonic Wars. The irst part contains an outline of the delation proiles and explanations 
of its causes. The second part shows the contrast between the delation of prices and 
the evolution of production costs, as well as presenting evidence about the differential 
impact on family farms and those using wage labour, the latter being the most severely 
affected. Finally, we review and weigh the three main courses of action available to 
farmers for overcoming the situation: i.e., organisational change, technical change, and 
institutional change. The irst and third options were the most relevant for the region 
under study; nevertheless, modest signs of technical change were also found.  
Résumé. Faire face à la délation en période de turbulence. Marchés agricoles et 
gestion des exploitations dans le sud de la Navarre (Espagne)
Cet article se propose d’identiier les traits communs et les particularités locales à 
l’œuvre dans la crise agricole généralisée qui suivit les guerres napoléoniennes. La 
première partie s’attache à décrire les proils délationnistes de cette crise et à en établir 
les causes. La seconde partie évoque le contraste entre la baisse des prix et l’évolution 
des coûts de production ; elle met en lumière l’impact différentiel de la crise, qui a 
davantage touché les exploitations recourant à une main-d’œuvre salariée que les ex-
ploitations familiales. Il s’agira enin d’évaluer les trois principaux registres d’action 
auxquels peuvent recourir les agriculteurs pour faire face à la situation, à savoir un 
changement organisationnel, un changement technique et un changement institutionnel. 
Si la première et la troisième option s’avérèrent les plus adaptées à la situation de la ré-
gion étudiée, on peut toutefois y observer quelques formes de changement technique.
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At a time like the present, when we are puzzled witnesses to a suc-
cession of steep rises in food and energy prices, immediately followed by 
falls so abrupt that they cause the almost forgotten ghost of delation to re-
emerge, the historian cannot help seeing analogies to other historical times. 
One of the most remarkable of these is the period following the Napoleonic 
Wars in Europe. As extensively recorded by the well-known historians who 
were associated with the International Scientiic Committee on Price His-
tory Project in 1930 (Beveridge, Posthumus, Abel, Labrousse, Hamilton), 
agricultural prices collapsed after 1817, after previously reaching their 
highest point in centuries.
In the Spanish case, it was the economic historian Josep Fontana who, 
in his 1971 book and in a 1978 article, pointed out the importance of the 
1817-1830 agrarian crisis, placing it in the wider European context, and 
concluded that it was a key stage in the transition to capitalism. In Fontana’s 
view the price fall combined with problems in the Royal Treasury, which 
was no longer able to depend on shipments of precious metals from the 
Americas. This exacerbated the social contradictions within the Spanish 
agricultural sector, leaving the peasants with the choice of either rebelling 
against the liberal nation-state and its new tax policy or revolting against 
the recipients of the old feudal tributes and tithes: that is, to choose between 
reaction (Carlism) or revolution (liberalism) 1. Since then we have learned a 
great deal more about issues such as structural changes in land ownership, 
social disputes, and evolution of some distributive variables such as wages 
and taxes during this period. But there are other changes that remain to be 
explored. 
In this paper we offer a re-evaluation of the nature and consequences 
of the post-1817 depression, based on local sources and on private accounts 
from farmers’ estates. First, the nature of the crisis is identiied - if indeed 
we may talk of a unique crisis. We shall also attempt to detail the conse-
quences of the crisis for farming and for the decisions which the various 
stakeholders.
1.  Fontana, J., 1971.
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1. Delation and its proiles: One crisis or several?
The period of 1808-1839, along with the early years of Franco’s regime 
(1936-1959), appears to have been the harshest in Spanish economic history. 
War was the deciding factor throughout these forty years: wars that resulted 
from foreign occupation (1808-1813), wars to attempt to keep colonies that 
had declared their independence (1814-1824), and wars intended to decide 
between the liberal and the counter-revolutionary visions of the nature of 
the state (1822-1823 and 1833-1839). The disruption caused by war to the 
public treasury and individual lives and fortunes was compounded by dis-
tortions in the functioning of markets. The period also saw the complete 
breakdown of the political system (in 1808) and three attempts at installing 
a liberal-inspired new institutional framework (1810-1813, 1820-1823, and 
inally, 1834-1837). In addition, with the loss of most of the overseas colo-
nies and the end of shipments of American precious metals, it was neces-
sary to re-direct foreign trade lows. Furthermore, violence on a daily basis 
was spreading, channelling the underlying social conlict through uprisings, 
banditry, and criminality 2. 
The prevailing tone of violence is also relected in market behav-
iour and price movements. Figure 1 sums up the evolution of agricultural 
prices in Southern Navarre in 1785-1840. It is a Laspeyres index with ixed 
weighting of eight agricultural goods which accounted for more than 90 per 
cent of the region’s produce 3. The index proile shows the well-known 
upward trend of agricultural prices through the eighteenth century, its par-
oxysm coinciding with the political cycle of the French Revolution. The 
shift in this trend in the following years lasted until the mid-nineteenth 
century. Figure 1 includes the main factors accounting for upward move-
ments in the curve: wars against France in 1793-1796, 1808-1814, and 1823, 
civil wars in 1822-1823 and 1833-1839, poor cereal crops in 1788-1789, 
1801-1802, 1802-1803, 1811-1812, 1815-1816, and 1831-1832, monetary 
reform in 1821 (annulled by counter-reformation in 1824), and inally, the 
ban on foreign grain imports which the constitutional government passed 
2.  For an overview of this period for Spanish rural areas, see M. T. Pérez Picazo, 1998. 
Social conlicts, banditry and delinquency are well analysed in J. torras, 1976. On Navarre, 
see J. De la torre, 1990; 1992; and Del río, R., 1987.
3.  The index is comprised as follows: wheat (37%), barley (13%), beans (5%), wine 
(17%), olive oil (15%), beef (2%), lamb (4%), and ordinary wool (7%). Prices are taken from 
private accounts and relect producer wholesale prices per accounting year. Further details are 
in J. M. lana-Berasain, 2011.
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on 5 August 1820 4. In addition to this upward cycle, the igure highlights 
the phenomenon that matters here: the steep fall in agricultural prices in 
1815-1830, the well-known European agrarian crisis analysed in detail by 
Wilhelm Abel 5.
Figure 1. Index of agricultural prices in southern Navarre, 1785-1840 
Source. lana-Berasain, J.-M., 2011.
Is it possible to talk of a single crisis, or would it be more appropriate 
to consider it as two consecutive crises, one in 1817-1819, and the other 
in 1825-1829? The latter seems to have been the case, as suggested by the 
4.  The ban was respected by Ferdinand VII after his restoration as absolute monarch in 
1823. Under the law, import of wheat would only be allowed in cases of extreme scarcity, 
when wheat prices reached 144 reales de vellón (rvn, from now on) per hectolitre (hl) (Mon-
tañés, E., 2009, p. 35). This coincided with similar regulations in England (1815, reformed 
in 1822 and 1828), which prohibited all wheat imports provided that the national price had 
not reached 80 shillings per quarter. France followed the same route in 1819 and so did the 
Netherlands in 1824 (aBel, W., 1986, p. 309, 314). In any case legal imports of wheat at the 
port of Barcelona continued between 1823 and 1827 (FraDera, J. M., 1984, p. 158-162), 
while smuggling of wheat reached a very signiicant but unknown magnitude (calosci, L., 
2006, p. 35-37).
5.  Abel, in fact, deines the early nineteenth century agricultural crisis as a three-phase 
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cyclical movement of the curve, with its differentiated slopes; moreover, 
eminent scholars believe the second interpretation to be the right one 6.
But, how would it have appeared to those living at the time of the 
events? Labrousse suggests that we view it from their perspective, limiting 
our picture of price movement to what has already occurred and not to what 
will happen in the future. Figure 2 is intended to provide that viewpoint, 
presenting each year’s prices as a percentage increase or decrease over the 
average of the previous ten years. For a more complete picture, Figure 2 
provides this information for each of the products comprising the index of 
agricultural prices. The result is conclusive. From the viewpoint of those 
who sold agricultural products in the market, each successive year resulted 
in prices lower than the previous ten years. This was the case almost with-
out exception from 1818 to 1833; ifteen years in a row of a negative rela-
tionship to the market. But did this also occur elsewhere on the continent?
Figure 2. Perception of a contemporary person. 
Variation percentage for each year in respect of the ten previous years’ average
Source. lana-Berasain, J.-M., 2011.
6.  The crisis, starting in 1825 and becoming worse in 1827-1828, was the prelude to 
the political revolution of 1830, according to E. laBrousse, 1980, p. 466-467, the crisis re-
sulted from scarcity, not delation, and was due to bad potato and cereal crops. The crisis also 
occurred in rural England, where it fuelled the Captain Swing uprising (HoBsBaWM, e. & 
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Figure 3. Wheat price evolution in Europe (1815-1830): a contemporary view: 
Percentage variations in annual prices with respect to the previous ten years
Source. My construct from aBel, 1986, p.  432-433, teDescHi, 2006, p.  465, 480, 
konDo, 1990, p. 253-256 and nogués, 2005, p.  395-396. 
(Germany´s prices are averaged from those of Hamburg, Rostock, Berlin, and Munich; those of 
Galicia are an average of Coruña, Lugo, and Pontevedra’s prices).
Even though it is not possible to compare the evolution of weighted in-
dexes of agricultural prices, we can examine the history of wheat prices, un-
doubtedly the most important agricultural product. Figure 3 allows us to see 
similarities and differences in the way various European regions perceived 
delation. Everywhere the fall of prices was constant for around a decade. 
The difference lies in when it began and when it ended: in England and 
Spain this was earlier than in Lombardy, France, and Germany. Moreover, 
Navarre was remarkably similar to Galicia and Barcelona, despite the fact 
that it had a customs and monetary system of its own until 1835. Therefore, 
it was not the peculiar customs policy of Navarre – which almost com-
pletely banned cereal exports from the Kingdom – or the narrowness of the 
domestic market that played a relevant role in the intensity and duration 
of delation. 7 What distinguishes Navarre – and Galicia and Barcelona as 
well – from the rest of Europe was the extraordinary duration of the price 
7.  Act 52, passed by the 1724-1726 Parliament (Cortes), which updated older regula-
tions of 1567, 1662, and 1678, banned the export of grains unless wheat reached a certain 
speciic price in the main cities (30 rvn per hectoliter, and never more than 40 rvn/hl) (Flo-
ristán-iMízcoz, A., 1982, p. 348-349). The 1817-1818 Parliament, after a crowded debate, 
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fall, which remained negative up to the 1830s, when other countries were 
already experiencing higher wheat prices. Thus, in Spain the agricultural 
crisis was more intense than in other parts of Europe, since it started earlier 
and inished much later. To those living at the time, therefore, the depres-
sion may have been seen as a single, endless phenomenon. Comparison 
with other regions, however, leads us to consider that it may have been due 
to a series of factors common to the entire continent, combined with some 
others speciic to Spain and some that were very local.
From Figures 2 and 3 we can deduce information about factors which 
caused the fall in prices. Two explanations do not seem to work when 
viewed from a global perspective. The irst holds that the price fall was not 
exceptional, but only a return to the levels of the late eighteenth century, be-
fore the French revolutionary cycle disrupted European markets. There was 
nothing forcing prices to return to a level abandoned forty years before; all 
the more if we take into account the widespread circulation of paper money 
and inlationary rise in the means of payment that happened in the mean-
time. But it is possible that in the Spanish case (as well as in the British) 
much of the early, dramatic price collapse may be an adjustment after the 
inlationary processes generated by the Peninsular War and the Continental 
System 8. 
The second explanation, the monetary interpretation, according to 
which the reduction in monetary supply accounts for the falling prices, is 
also unsatisfactory. This theory accounts for the fall either through reduced 
monetary production and the introduction of American silver, or from 
tighter control on paper money issue by European governments 9. The his-
torical counter-arguments have been that the low supply of gold and silver 
following the American wars of independence may have been more than 
counterbalanced by the change in the commercial balance with Asia - China 
in particular - as a result of the opium trade 10. If the explanation is indeed 
the amount of circulating money, however, the effect on each and all of the 
goods should have been the same. But that is not the case. Although the 
106.65 rvn/hl (Cuadernos de Leyes y Agravios, Pamplona, Institución Príncipe de Viana, 
1964, vol. 2, p. 342-351).
8.  Van BatH, B. H. S., 1978, p. 337-339; nogués, P., 2005, p. 382.
9.  vilar, P., 1982, p.  465-466; kinDleBerger, C. P., 1988, p.  86-88; crouzet, F., 1999, 
p. 46-48. 
10.  Fontana, J., 1978; although the annual average production of gold and silver fell 
between 1801-1810 and 1811-1820 around 35-40 per cent (ortí Brull, V., 1893, p. 174-175), 
other forms of money supply (such as deposits, orders, and bills of exchange) could make up 
for it (caMeron, R., 1974, p. 59-68).
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monetary explanation is not suficiently credible in general terms, it does 
shed some light on the peculiarities of the Spanish case, and particularly on 
the extraordinary duration of the depression and on its relative improve-
ment in the early 1820s. The monetary reform adopted by the constitutional 
regime on 21 June 1821 led to expectations that the monetary supply would 
be increased through the devaluation implicit in increased rates of acquisi-
tion and in reduced retentions to cover minting costs (braceaje) and taxes 
(señoreaje). The reverse effect occurred in the 20 August 1824 monetary 
counter-reformation which, in seeking to increase iscal income, raised re-
tention rates and sharply reduced prices for metal purchases, setting them 
below the equilibrium price. This policy, which remained in force until the 
15 April 1848 monetary reform, reduced minting activity. Furthermore, 
there was much hoarding and exporting of silver coins caused by mistaken 
decisions on exchange rates with the French franc and a bi-metallic rela-
tionship that undervalued silver with respect to gold. The overall result was 
an acute monetary shortage in Spain, for which the Kingdom of Navarre’s 
monetary autonomy was no compensation 11.
Setting aside these explanations, except as contributory factors, we 
should focus on the supply and demand side. From the supply viewpoint, 
the falling prices may have been the consequence of overproduction brought 
about by using extensive methods to increase productive capacity, or by an 
increase in productivity that led to a corresponding reduction in production 
cost, through specialisation (Smith) or technological change (Schumpeter). 
Extensive cultivation methods are not rare during widespread warfare, as 
was the case in Europe in 1792-1815, where the problems of nations at 
war may have boosted the productive capacity of regions distant from the 
front with low technological potential. The clearest example of this was 
the southern Russian steppes, which began to trade grain through the port 
of Odessa 12. The technological explanation is also feasible on a European 
level if we consider that several regions (especially the English country-
side) had been experiencing intense transformations since the mid-eight-
eenth century owing to the spread of new growing techniques that provided 
improved yields 13. 
11.  The characterization of 1821 and 1824 monetary reforms follows J. sarDá, 1948, 
p. 43-76 and P. Pascual, 2004, p. 62-67. Minting in the Kingdom of Navarre was restricted to 
copper coins from the mid-seventeenth century. The scarcity of this metal forced people to ac-
cept two consecutive devaluations: from 122 monetary pieces produced (maravedís) per peso 
unit (pound) to 181 in 1818, and 191 in 1829 (Marín De la saluD, J., 1975, p. 351-454).
12.  Van zanDen, J. l. & van riel, A., 2000, p. 125.
13.  tHoMPson, F. M. L., 1968; cHorley, G. P. H., 1981.
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Furthermore, this supply-side explanation inds support in the dif-
fering behaviour of the prices of various goods. Thus, while price falls 
were soon apparent in grains (wheat, barley, beans), and in beef, such 
falls in other products (especially those from the Mediterranean, such as 
wine, olive oil, and wool) took longer. Should we interpret this as an ef-
fect of better goods transport on the continent, and increased competition 
for typical northern Europe agricultural goods? We should not forget that 
price formation in a poorly accessible interior relected the likelihood of 
directing surplus to large consumer markets on the coast such as Barce-
lona, which were open to cheaper imports 14. Yet dificulties soon reached 
those sectors, too. Wine was especially volatile, with severe price col-
lapses in 1819-1822 and 1832-1833. In fact, throughout the 1820s, it was 
these Mediterranean tree and shrub products – whose supply was inlexible 
because of the ixed capital costs of plantation – that suffered from a seri-
ous fall. Meanwhile, cereals were favoured by an 1820 customs ban and 
experienced a slight improvement; however, their price fell again in 1826 
and 1829-1830. 
Table 1. Index of baptisms in Northern 






Index % Index % Index %
1782-1786 87 88 87
1787-1791 87 0.4 87 -1.1 87 -0.4
1792-1796 87 -0.6 96 10.5 92 5.5
1797-1801 100 15.5 100 3.9 100 8.8
1802-1806 100 -0.5 99 -0.8 99 -0.6
1807-1811 109 9.8 101 1.9 105 5.4
1812-1816 90 -17.5 97 -4.5 94 -10.5
1817-1821 99 10.2 106 10.2 103 10.2
1822-1826 112 13.0 109 2.5 111 7.0
1827-1831 119 5.5 111 1.5 114 3.3
1832-1836 115 -2.6 104 -5.8 109 -4.3
1837-1841 112 -2.6 99 -4.9 105 -3.8
Source. My construct from A. garcía-sanz-Marcotegui, 1992.
14.  Pascual, P., 1990, p. 8.
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If we search for an explanation on the demand level, the sustained 
fall in agricultural prices could have been a consequence of demographic 
stagnation, a fall in consumer purchasing capacity, or an increase in auto-
consumption. The irst of these hypotheses is not even credible at a local 
level, let alone a continental one. The records of baptisms performed in Na-
varre reveal several points of marked demographic retreat, both in the north, 
devoted to cattle ranching and forestry, and in the agricultural south; these 
coincided with consecutive periods of war and famine early in the century. 
Nevertheless, the overall balance is positive and especially prolonged from 
1817 to 1831. The second hypothesis, a fall in consumer purchasing capaci-
ty seems feasible if we follow contemporary testimony. Thus, in April 1818, 
the Parliament of Navarre was forced to take measures against beggars, 
because « la multitud de pobres que vienen a algunos pueblos los inicionan 
a éstos, concluyéndose no pocas veces en darse muchos de ellos a ladrones 
públicos, y siguiéndose de todo esto el entibiarse la caridad de los Cris-
tianos y quitarse la limosna a los naturales » (« the high number of poor 
coming to some villages infected them, and it is not rare for many of them 
to end up as public thieves, all of this leading to a cooling down of Chris-
tian charity and the witholding of alms from local people ») 15. This picture 
of misery was echoed by foreign observers like P. Deby, who referred in 
1825 to « des villages où une population létrie par l’indigence semble se 
débattre contre les causes qui retardent son bien-être » (« villages where 
the poverty-stricken population, seems to be struggling against the causes 
which hamper its well-being »), although A. Moreau de Jonnès stated ten 
years later that « la multitud de mendigos va disminuyendo, cesando las 
limosnas que encontraban en las puertas de los monasterios » (« the crowd 
of mendicants is diminishing, as the alms at the monasteries’ doors are ceas-
ing ») 16. Rural misery does not it at all with the evolution evident in real 
wages, since daily wages -as we are about to see – suffered less than prices. 
We should bear in mind, however, that the rising purchasing power may be 
compatible with a reduction in real income, if job opportunities also dimin-
ish, leading to a reduction in days worked per year. Finally, the spread of 
a subsistence economy may have been a way to minimize the adverse ef-
fect, in view of the continuing fall in market prices and job opportunities. 
15.  Cuadernos de Leyes y Agravios, Pamplona, Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1964, 
vol. 2, p. 320. Act 74 set harsh rules to reduce the number of vagabonds and beggars, sub-
mitting such activity to a regime of temporary licenses granted locally by the parish priest 
and the mayor. In January 1830, the city of Tudela created a Charity Board to take charge 
of collecting provisions and distributing them to the poor, dealing with up to 3,082 needy, 
and allocating 385 hectoliters of wheat, 73 of legumes, 149 pieces of bread, and 3,334 reales 
(Fuentes Pascual, F., 1958, p. 167-168).
16.  DeBy, P. N.H., 1825, p. 128; Moreau De Jonnes, A., 1835, p. 93.
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But, if such was the case, it would have been more a consequence than 
a cause of delation. Besides, the opposite position can also be defended. 
Small producers may have strengthened their ties to the market by increas-
ing the amount of marketed crops, which was promoted by the popularity of 
the potato, or by pushing forward with specialisation in market crops such 
as the vineyards or olive orchards. The growing need of the state to col-
lect cash taxes, as Fontana pointed out, also supports the latter option. The 
fact that the ban on cereal imports fostered the integration of the domestic 
market, despite Spain’s transport limitations, argues against the notion of a 
withdrawal into subsistence 17. Moreover, a general phenomenon such as a 
European-wide delation must be explained through causes of an equally 
widespread validity. 
One inal argument deserves consideration. While the prices of goods 
were falling, the relative cost of transport was increasing. In Navarre agri-
cultural prices were cut almost in half but daily rental for a two-mule cart 
was only reduced from 32 reales de vellón to 24 and 20 rvn, and the daily 
cost of mule transport went down only from 12 to 9 and 8 rvn, and the cost 
of using of donkeys went from 6 reales to 5 and 4 rvn. In all three cases, 
the decrease was only 25 per cent until 1820, and even a third during that 
decade – much less than the fall in prices of agricultural products in the 
corresponding period. This phenomenon was probably not an exception in 
the European context, and perhaps had a backlash effect on the supply of 
goods. Ultimately, it may have contributed to the efforts to reduce transport 
costs through investment in infrastructure and technological change. 
All in all, it seems that, when trying to explain the causes of the deep 
delation which started in 1817, we should favour an eclectic interpreta-
tion that stresses, as did Abel 18, supply factors, but which does not com-
pletely exclude other arguments. The increase in the productive capacity 
of European agriculture in the last decades of the eighteenth century, in 
some cases owing to technical improvements and in others to the removal 
of institutional barriers, was fully apparent when the end of Napoleonic 
Wars allowed commercial low to resume on a continent-wide level. The 
fall in prices, with different sequences for each of the goods, may have been 
worsened by the relative rise in transport costs, especially for those inland 
regions that had to entrust their merchandise to systems as expensive and 
ineffective as bridle paths, or at best, cart-tracks. The reduction in demand 
in the large coastal centres of consumption, as they turned to cheaper sea-
17.  Fontana, J., 1978; MaDrazo, S., 1984; Barquín, R., 1996.
18.  aBel, W., 1986, p. 328-331.
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borne supplies, reduced the demand for some products that could not be re-
channelled. Stocks were piling up, as manager Julián de Larumbe warned 
in May of 1818 from Cintruénigo: « por falta de compradores » (« due to 
a lack of buyers ») and because « hay muchos ganosos de vender a dicho 
precio y aún a menos » (« there are many willing to sell at that price and 
even for less ») 19. The decrease in circulating money may have worsened 
the situation; it is a convincing argument to explain the extraordinary dura-
tion and intensity of Spanish delation with respect to Europe.
2. Victims and answers: 
organisational, technical or political change?
Delation did not affect all social groups equally, nor all agricultural 
production stakeholders. Naturally, it favoured consumers who saw their 
purchasing power increased. This was certainly an advantage, provided they 
were able to pay, which was not always the case 20. First, we must consider 
the currency shortage itself, especially severe in the case of copper coins 
used for small transactions 21. Currency was scarcer in rural areas, where 
barter often made up for the absence of cash; therefore, the advantages of 
delation were probably limited to cities, where a greater number of peo-
ple relied on market relationships 22. There are contemporary testimonies 
condemning the high level of consumption by artisans, traders, and people 
in the liberal professions compared to the low consumption of the rural 
masses 23. Nevertheless, artisans and their employees did not enjoy such a 
19.  Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Sección Nobleza, Bornos, c.172, d.1.
20.  anes, G., 1970, p. 437.
21.  The worst shortage of small change must have coincided with the turn of the century. 
None of the 30,000 ducados commissioned for minting by the Parliament (Cortes) of Navarre 
in 1796 were made, and of an equal amount ordered by this institution in 1818, only half were 
actually minted. Of the 20,000 duros commissioned by the Parliament in 1829, 48 per cent 
was still to be minted in 1838. (Marín De la saluD, J., 1975, p. 351-438). In all of Spain, the 
eight million reales minted in silver and gold in 1824-1834 were, according to Sardá, clearly 
insuficient (sarDá, J., 1948, p. 70). The shortage of national cash was compensated, as the 
authors quoted point out, by the abundant circulation of silver and copper French currency.
22.  Fontana, J., 1971, p. 334-336.
23.  A clergyman who introduced himself as the Procurador de los labradores del País 
del Grano (Attorney General of Grain Farmers of the Country) outlined in 1817 a pictur-
esque contrast between the farmers  consumption and that of traders and artisans, concluding: 
« Mírense los adornos de sus casas y el de las nuestras, mírese cómo visten, comen y beben 
ellos y sus familias, y cómo nosotros, y se hallará una diferencia exorbitante » (« Look at 
the ornaments in their houses, and at those in ours; look at how they and their families dress, 
eat and drink, and how we do; you shall ind an exorbitant difference ») (Archivo General 
de Navarra, AGN, Reino, Agricultura Artes &, lg.3, c.14). Joaquín Undiano, parish priest 
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signiicant improvement either; free-import customs policy for cloth and 
proitable smuggling between France and Castile looded the country with 
cheap manufactured goods 24. The outlook for other urban sectors dedicated 
to trade, law, and money-lending was surely more promising. In addition to 
the business opportunities offered to traders by smuggling, all of them, in-
cluding clergymen, had strengthened their positions as creditors because of 
the income generated from loaned capital, the purchasing capacity of which 
increased owing to delation. 
Though consumers and creditors may have been favoured by delation, 
producers and debtors were not so fortunate – and often they were the same 
people. Peasants and urban traders requested most of the mortgage loans 
(60%), though in small amounts (only 23% of borrowed capital); the nobil-
ity held most of the money (29%), with landowners (20%) and then city 
magistrates 25. It must have been particularly hard to pay ixed amounts of 
money while prices decreased and the state increased taxes. A good exam-
ple of that was the Giménez de Cascante family, who were nobles entitled 
to a seat in the Parliament of Navarre. Their four entailed estates (mayor-
azgos) covered 83 hectares, and they also had 13 hectares as free estates in 
1830 26. On the entailed estates there were loans representing 321,559 reales 
de vellón (rvn), which had to be paid off with annual returns for 8,114 rvn. 
While this amount remained unchanged between 1815 and 1830, prices of 
wheat and olive oil, the estate’s main sources of income, were reduced by 
61 per cent. In 1830, it was not unusual for these entailed estates to be owed 
42,819 rvn, the equivalent of more than ive annual payments 27. If this was 
of Lizarraga, stated in a memorandum to the Parliament that « entre todas las clases de la 
sociedad ninguna se mantiene con tanta escasez y miseria... Los labradores son los que peor 
comen, los que peor beben, los que peor visten, sin embargo de ser los que más trabajan » 
(« among all of the classes of society, none subsists with such scarcity and misery... Peasants 
are the worst fed and dressed; however, they are the ones who work the most ») (AGN, Reino, 
Estadística, lg.49, c.29).
24.  It does not seem that the efforts of the Parliament of Navarre to foster local industry 
making it easier for foreign manufacturers to settle – were of much use. About the smuggling 
issue, see R. Del río, 1985, p. 169-199.
25.  lana-Berasain, J.-M. & De la torre, J., 2011.
26.  AGN, Sección Archivos Particulares, Baronía de la Torre, box 1, Inventario post-
mortem de José María Giménez de Cascante.
27.  To that, the accrued debt of the free estate, 2,914 rvn, has to be added. That sum was 
set to respond for another seven loans of 64,637 rvn. In 1827, an arranged marriage of José 
María Giménez de Cascante to the daughter of the Baron of Beniparrell allowed him to use 
the 10,647 rvn dowry in « pagamentos censales y otras urgentes obligaciones » (« mortgage 
payments and other urgent obligations ») (AGN, Sección Archivos Particulares, Baronía de la 
Torre, box 1). Besides, in 1824 and 1828 and after permission by the royal courts, they were 
forced to sell several farms of the entailed estate for a total of 31,024 rvn (ibid.). This family 
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the case for a very powerful family, it is easy to imagine the consequences 
of indebtedness for more modest estates.
For farmers, in fact, delation had terrible consequences. Figure 4 al-
lows us to assess the evolution of agricultural prices and the costs of the 
main factors for this. The series is shown as a series of index numbers with 
a base (= 100) in a much earlier period: 1783-1787. In this way, the distor-
tions caused by the acute inlation of the Peninsular War period are avoided. 
What is more, it allows us to incorporate luctuations in the series during the 
long wave that began in that decade.
Table 2. Simulation of an account of income and expenses of cultivation per 
land hectare for exploitations with wage labour 
and family labour in biennial cultivation (« año y vez »)
Unit 1815 1820 1825 1830
Technical rates
Sowing frame Hl/ha 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35
Yield per seed 1: 5 5 5 5
Wheat production Hl/ha 11.75 11.75 11.75 11.75
Deductions
Tithe Hl/ha 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47
Reserved seed Hl/ha 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35
Land rent Hl/ha 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.86
Available for sale Hl/ha 6.07 6.07 6.07 6.07
Cultivation rates
Fertilizers Qm/ha 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4
Fertilizer application Peons/ha 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Plough fallows Yoke/ha 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7
Dig fallows Peons/ha 25 25 25 25
Sowing Peons/ha 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Seed covering Yoke/ha 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Hoeing Women/ha 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Reaping Peons/ha 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1
was one of the 113 houses in the Kingdom that had to pay the compulsory loan imposed by 
the French general Reille. The requested 900 duros (equivalent to 18,000 rvn) had forced 
them to sell a house and two orchards, which had to be rescued by « empeñarse por una parte 
y malvender sus frutos por otra » (« pawning, on the one hand, and selling the fruits at a loss, 
on the other ») (ibídem).
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Threshing and throwing Peons/ha 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Threshing and throwing Yoke/ha 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Cart-carrying Carts/ha 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Horse carrying Horses/ha 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Prices
Male day-wage Rvn/day 6.7 5.3 4.7 4.4
Female day-wage Rvn/day 2.5 2.2 2.3 1.9
Yoke day-pay Rvn/day 24.7 18.8 18.1 16.0
Cart day-pay Rvn/day 32 26 24 22.5
Horse day-pay Rvn/day 12 8.3 8 8
Manure Rvn/Qm 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.8
Wheat price (Aug-Sept) Rvn/hl 90.3 62.0 56.5 45.0
Wheat price (Apr-May) Rvn/hl 100.5 71.6 60.5 50.6
Crop value
In August-September prices: Rvn/ha 548.1 376.3 343.1 273.1
In April-May prices Rvn/ha 610.0 435.0 367.3 307.0
Model with wage labour
a. Wheeling and manure cost Rvn/ha 299.50 233.57 219.95 195.30
b. Cost of labour Rvn/ha 116.62 94.28 84.45 77.52
Outlay (a+b) Rvn/ha 416.11 327.85 304.41 272.81
Available balance* Rvn/ha 193.89 107.14 62.84 34.22
Index 100 55.3 32.4 17.7
Model with family labour
a. Wheeling and manure cost Rvn/ha 140.72 110.24 102.08 92.04
b. Cost of labour Rvn/ha 283.34 227.67 201.82 186.38
Outlay (a) Rvn/ha 140.72 110.24 102.08 92.04
Available balance* Rvn/ha 407.35 266.02 241.01 181.04
Index 100 65.3 59.2 44.4
Equivalent wheat Hl/ha 4.51 4.29 4.27 4.03
Index 100 95.1 94.7 89.4
* The calculations for the wage model and the family labour model differ in land-preparatory 
tasks before sowing and carrying of the ripe grains. The wage model implies execution of three 
yoke and plough tasks and carrying in a two -wheel and two-animal-cart. The family labour im-
plies a manual preparatory task and carrying by horseback. The produce in the wage model is sold 
at April-May prices; the family labour model at August-September prices.
Sources. Jaen, C., 1904, p. 143-182 and Junta Consultiva Agronómica (1891, II, p. 461-504) for 
labour rates; Barquín, 2001, for average wheat prices in Tudela in August-September and April-
May; average prices of factors are taken from the above private accounts.
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By 1815 the inlationary process had affected, in this order: equip-
ment, agricultural prices, and daily wages. The rent on the land, paid in 
a ixed amount of grain, was 12 per cent higher than the 1785 rent, while 
the interest on long-term mortgage money had risen by 30 per cent. By 
1821 agricultural prices had returned to those of the 1780s. Farm equip-
ment drawn by animals and labour costs had adjusted as well; this adjust-
ment, though, did not make up for the fall in agricultural prices. For those 
offering their services or their animals for rent, this was undoubtedly good 
news; however, for those forced to hire them, it represented a steep rise in 
costs. On the other hand, the rental price for land and money loans tended to 
increase until 1826, and then become stable. Agricultural prices, however, 
collapsed irremediably to a level lower than that of 1785 28. Table 2 shows 
some of the consequences of this evolution for price and cost structures in 
agricultural operations.
In this simulation credible technical rates and average prices in ive-
year periods around 1815, 1820, 1825, and 1830 are used to estimate 
operation margins for those large production units employing wage la-
bour (referred to hereafter as « commercial farms ») and the small farms 
using family labour alone (« family farms » which could also produce for 
the market) 29. For the irst, more capital and labour-intensive, needs have 
been assumed as 31.3 days’ wages per hectare, 11 of which would be for 
draught animals and carts. The second type of farms, more labour-inten-
sive, would require 50.8 days’ pay per hectare, and only 5.5 for animal 
use. If we assume wheat was cultivated at 11.75 hls/ha, and deduct tithes, 
seed, and land-rent amounts, the amount available to be traded would be 
28.  Proof of the evolution of factor cost in other regions can be found in M. T. Pérez 
Picazo, 2005, and E. L. garraBou & L. tello, 2002.
29.  In order to calculate production per hectare, the initial sowing frame was set as 2.36 hl 
of wheat per ha, a igure proven by several sources (among them, AGN, Reino, Estadística, 
lg. 49, c.29), and a seed yield of 1:5. That is how a yield of 11.75 hl of wheat per hectare is 
suggested. From that quantity, a 12.5% deduction is deducted as tithe and irst-fruit (diezmo 
y primicia) payment obligations, seed reserve for the next sowing and a quantity of 1.86 hl 
of wheat as land rent; all of these data come from private accounts. Technical rates of costs 
for farming for the region are taken from data recorded by engineers of the Servicio Nacional 
Agronómico (Agricultural National Service) by the late nineteenth century, assuming that, 
except when dealing with modern farming equipment, criteria and intensity for agriculture 
had not changed substantially. A different combination of farming practices has been assumed 
for the two types of holdings. That using wage labour, presumably with higher amounts of 
land and capital, would use draught animals for ploughing, while the small family farm would 
use manual labour with hoes and other implements, since the opportunity cost would be lower 
for them. On similar grounds, it has been assumed that commercial farms would use higher 
capacity equipment (carts), while family farms would use cheaper horseback transport. For 
fertilizer, we assumed the use of 4,700 kg of manure per hectare every ive years. 
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6.07 hls/ha. The simulation presents two levels of wheat prices: one for 
the months immediately prior to harvest (April-May), when large produc-
tive units with wage labour could wait to trade their produce, and another 
for the months immediately following (August-September), when we as-
sume small family exploitations were forced to sell. In both cases, at the 
average prices in force for each period, the produce per hectare would 
have been cut in half. Meanwhile, assuming that working methods had 
not changed, costs would have been cut only by a third. For the large pro-
duction units purchasing all of their inputs from the market, this would 
have meant a fall in net income from 194 reales per hectare around 1815 
to 107 reales in 1820, 63 reales around 1825, and 34 reales in 1830. The 
market evolution, therefore, seriously affected producers more closely 
linked to it, reducing their income to 18 per cent of what they could have 
enjoyed around 1815. 
Meanwhile, the holding that used a family labour force, or resorted to 
bartering labour with similar farms during peaks of seasonal activity, was 
better able to endure the crisis. By replacing the three plough tasks by deep-
digging with manual implements and by doing without wage-earners for the 
other tasks, farming costs directly dependent on market supply were cut to 
a third of the total. In this way, its cash on hand, assuming all the produce 
was traded, would have suffered only a minor decrease from 407 reales 
per hectare around 1815 to 266 reales in 1820, 241 reales around 1825, and 
181 reales in 1830. If we assume that such a balance was not held in cash 
but kept as wheat to feed the family, the igures would have shifted from 
four and a half hectolitres per hectare in 1815 to four hectolitres in 1830, 
or only 10 per cent less. If we accept that the amount of wheat required to 
feed a person for a year was 800 grams per person per day, equivalent to 
3.7 hectolitres of wheat per year 30, this means that the produce of a culti-
vated hectare might have covered the payment obligations and assured the 
subsistence of more than one person. It should be borne in mind that many 
of these farm families were forced to offer their labour on the market due 
to their limited supply of land. They were, therefore, small landowners and 
labourers. As such, delation gave them greater purchasing power than the 
wages earned by renting their arms or their teams. The contrast with com-
mercial farms cannot be clearer. While the latter witnessed reduced gains, 
family farms were more stable and proved to be more resilient.
The above may be somewhat approximate, but it can help to identify 
the different effects of delation on the viability of these exploitations. We 
30.  BairocH, P., 1997, I, p. 152.
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should add to these calculations some other liabilities which are particularly 
important, such as prior mortgage debts acquired by farmers, or the tax 
levies imposed by the monarchy through the feudal Parliament of Navarre 
in 2 August 1818 and 25 March 1829 (12.67 and 7.50 million reales, re-
spectively), or by the constitutional government between 1820 and 1823 
(11.53 million reales) 31. That would only worsen the loss of margin for 
cereal producers, making it essential to have alternatives in order to adapt 
to such adverse circumstances. Theoretically, there were three ways to com-
pensate for those trends and endure the delation. These different, though 
not incompatible directions were: organisational change, technical change, 
and institutional change.
The irst and the simplest was organisational change that adapted 
management strategy to the new circumstances. The farmer could replace 
the cheapest products with others, such as turning land used to cultivate 
cereals into vineyards, or changing agricultural land to pastures for live-
stock. As we have seen, the evolution of relative prices for grains, wine and 
olive oil relected these changes immediately after 1815; but in the short 
term farmers may have been trapped between ixed investments in planta-
tions and the risk of overproduction. The second organisational solution 
(particularly for large properties) was to shift the burden of the adjustment 
cost to the small family farm, whose resiliency we just demonstrated. An 
example was the land sales in censo reservativo, a method of inancing 
sales where the purchaser retained the whole or a fraction of the purchase 
price, paying in exchange a ixed annual money rent 32. Another method 
was the transfer by lease of estates formerly managed by owners to wage 
labour. That is exactly what the Marquis of San Adrián did in 1818 with the 
vineyards he managed in Cascante, which had been yielding annually an 
average of 1,500 litres of wine 33. In 1824, Manuela Sesma Miñano, Tomás 
Arteta’s widow, abandoned cereal farming and leased out the four hectares 
31.  Del río, R., 1991.
32.  The Tudela Hospital was one of the most active « ground renters » in those years. In 
June 1815, it sold 14 vineyard estates covering 7.93 hectares at a price of 38,347 rvn, which 
remained in the purchaser‘s hands at 5% interest. In May 1820, it sold another 16 estates 
covering 10.77 hectares at a price of 49,767 reales, and the eleven purchasers left agreed 
to a payment of 5 per cent interest on the capital (AGN, Contaduría de Hipotecas, Tudela, 
libro 246).
33.  Direct farming in this location was not resumed until 1877 (Archivo de los Mar-




she had sown up to that time 34. In 1832, she ordered the stumps removed 
from 2.29 hectares of vines, which were then transferred to lease, and in 
1835 she ordered removal of all the olive trees from the bigger farm (the 
Dehesilla y Ontinar, covering 10.24 hectares) and committed the land to 
large investments (4,805 rvn to level the terrain, build irrigation ditches, 
and plant more than a thousand fruit trees, besides spending 32,533 rvn in 
building houses and stockyards) to accommodate ive families of settlers, 
who paid a combined rent in wheat and money 35. In other cases, such as the 
Count of Bornos’ olive groves, that possibility was considered but inally 
rejected 36. 
Table 3. Price evolution of rent and land sales 
in Mejana de Tudela, 1816-1845







Years Rvn/ha Index Rvn/ha Index % % Index
1813-1814 - - 28,229 75 - - 141
1816-1820 1,753 100 37,745 100 4.6 4.7 100
1821-1825 1,794 102 30,163 80 5.9 4.9 74
1826-1830 1,561 89 30,010 80 5.2 4.7 57
1831-1835 1,180 67 21,506 57 5.5 5.0 61
1836-1840 1,595 91 26,078 69 6.1 5.3 79
1841-1845 1,744 99 37,362 99 4.7 5.5 66
Sources. AGN, Contaduría de Hipotecas, libros 246-250; AGN, Protocolos Notariales, 
tuDela, J. Yanguas y MiranDa, J., 1813, p. 20-95; 1814, p. 27-85; 1820, caja 2-3.
Leasing was also beginning to emerge as a proitable business despite 
the agrarian crisis, because of the lexibility of small family holdings with 
a low opportunity- cost labour force. This observation is clearly supported 
34.  According to the account books started in 1822, the year‘s crops were 112.4 hecto-
litres of cereal, and 18 hectolitres were sown in 1823. Direct management affected 9.43 ha. 
of vines and 7.29 ha. of olive orchards (AGN, Sección archivos particulares, Arteta, caja 13, 
no. 53).
35.  Management of this farm was recorded in a separate notebook (AGN, Sección ar-
chivos particulares, Arteta, caja 15, no.2). The transformation of cash rents into payments in 
kind, which we also found in this period, may have been used to protect the landowner from 
small tenants  lack of liquidity.
36.  The Cintruénigo estate accounts of 1830 show the payment for an expert report on 
the potential yield of olive orchards under lease in 1822-1826 (AHN, Sección Nobleza del 
AHN, Bornos, c. 172, d. 1).
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by the movement of land sale prices and rent in Mejana de Tudela; though 
not large (57 hectares) it was a naturally very fertile area by the Ebro River 
and was used for intensive horticultural farming. The municipality owned 
the area until 1813, when it was privatised and divided into 152 small lots 
between October and May 1814 to cover the enormous expense of supplies 
and exactions demanded by opposing armies. The price of the land was ini-
tially evaluated at 23,100 reales per hectare, subsequently raised in public 
auctions up to 28,230 rvn/ha. In 1820, the City Hall put out four more lots to 
tender, valued at 29,600 reales per hectare at an auction price of 37,916 re-
ales 37. While agricultural prices sank (Table 3), land prices, on the contrary, 
increased, possibly as a result of capitalists seeking sheltered investments 
for the extraordinary proits they had made during the years of war and in-
lation. Title deeds for sales between individuals recorded in the Accounts of 
Mortgage books relect a subsequent depreciation of around 20 per cent in 
the following decade; the lowest point was reached in the mid-1830s. What 
is interesting to note, however, is that the ratio between rent and sale prices 
evolved to 6 per cent, signiicantly above the average type of interest in ef-
fect for loans of capital in the region.
The change in landowner strategies can be seen in Figure 5, which 
shows the evolution of wage expenses from several estates 38. The decrease 
in wage expenses can be perceived in all of them, partly due to the aban-
donment of direct management, and partly to the decrease in the intensity 
of labour compared to farming. This often implied overlooking some non-
essential farming tasks such as giving a vineyard a second hoeing. In some 
other cases, however, new tasks were introduced which allowed for im-
proved performance of the labour force in operations of higher volume and 
cost. Thus, from October 1827, there are notes in the accounts of the Count 
of Bornos’ olive orchard, about the cost of using a labourer and horses to 
level the terrain « para poder coxer con más facilidad y a menos coste la 
oliva » (« in order to harvest the olives more easily and at less cost ») 39. In 
digging vineyards as well, some changes were introduced as in the case of 
the Marquis of San Adrián’s in Monteagudo, where he was able to reduce 
37.  AGN, Protocolos Notariales, Tudela, José Yanguas y Miranda (1813: 20-95; 1814: 
27-85; 1820: caja 2-3).
38.  Sources used for these series were: 
AMSA (Monteagudo), Cuentas generales (cajas 53, 34, 41, 62, 38, 62, 49, 18, 33, 24, 38, 
25, 43, 24, 33, 24, 17); AGN (Pamplona), sección archivos particulares, Arteta, caja 13 (53), 
14 (21) and 15 (2, 27); ibidem, Baronía de la Torre, cajas 1, 12, 19, 24 and 26; AHN, Sección 
Nobleza del AHN, Bornos, c.172, d.
39.  AHN, Sección Nobleza del AHN, Bornos, caja 172, d.1. 
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the number of workers required per hectare from 34 to 25 in the period 
between 1800 and 1845 40. 
These examples reveal some landowners’ interest in using labour-sav-
ing procedures. And this is precisely what our second option points to. In 
the long run, the most secure and signiicant alternative would have been 
to increase productivity through the lever of technical change. The goal 
could have been to raise the value of the produce obtained per unit of land, 
either increasing or regulating the amount of agricultural product obtained 
or introducing plants with a higher added value. But it could also have been 
to reduce the number of employees per unit of produce, the best example 
being the replacement of labour by capital through mechanization. In any 
case, the situation of the various agrarian production units differed. As al-
ready seen, the reduction in the number of labourers employed may have 
been caused by the needs of large holdings using wage earners, but this was 
not the case in family farming. In the smaller farms, the owners may have 
preferred to raise the value of the produce, even though it meant a greater 
amount of work. In any case, Spanish historiography has given little credit 
to the possibility of a signiicant technical change in nineteenth-century Ibe-
rian agriculture, given that until the late nineteenth century mechanization 
was almost nonexistent 41. 
The truth is that it was not a simple and affordable option, mainly be-
cause it carried a risk. Moreover, technical change cannot be improvised: it 
requires a great deal of prior knowledge and expertise and an eficient low 
of information. By the late eighteenth century there was a set of alternatives, 
to a great extent adapted from the new agriculture in Northern Europe, but 
also arising from a re-interpretation of classic recipes such as those of 
Columela or Herrera 42: investment in irrigation infrastructure, spreading 
new crops for human and animal consumption (potato, corn, turnips, beet-
root, alfalfa), new rotations, tree cultivation, and improved tillage with metal 
implements. The account books conirm that some of these initiatives were 
taken, especially those referring to arboriculture (olives and vineyards in al-
most all cases or fruit plantations in Manuela Sesma’s farm) and irrigation. 
For example, between 1828 and 1830, the Marquis of San Adrián invested 
12,500 reales to build a clay dam to irrigate his olive orchard; some years 
later Manuela Sesma’s accounts record an outlay of 300 reales in 1843 for 
40.  lana-Berasain, J. M., 1995, p. 153.
41.  siMPson, J., 1995; garraBou, R., 1990; Martínez-ruiz, J.-I., 2000, p. 52-71.
42.  argeMí, L., 1985.
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a subscription to a plan for constructing a large clay-built pond 43. Although 
there are no testimonies, family farming may have only performed some 
apparently minor innovations, but these could be very important for saving 
land, such growing potatoes, which freed up more wheat for the market, or 
the conditioning seeds against parasites before sowing, a practice promoted 
by clergymen, which may have reduced luctuations in yields 44. They could 
save short-term capital expenses too, making the seeding framework less 
extensive, as some contemporaneous treatises on agronomy suggested 45. 
All in all, it has been correctly pointed out that technological change cannot 
be addressed separately from the institutional framework in which it occurs, 
and its limited progress in the eighteenth century was to a great extent the 
fault of obsolete political and social structures.
The last option, equally risky, was institutional change. To achieve 
this, individual decision-making was not enough; there was a need to es-
tablish co-operation and initiate some collective mobilisation of resources 
and this entailed a political stand. This also relects path dependence: the 
conlicts that occurred during this depression cannot be understood without 
considering the clashes and tensions experienced in the previous stage of 
acute inlation. For small farms, the key lay in improving the ratio of land to 
human beings, which could allow more eficient use of family labour. This 
would overcome the resistance of the feudal lords, jealous of their political 
control over the community. It also required overcoming the opposition of 
sheep breeders, organised in guilds (mestas), and rentier landowners, all 
represented in local councils and interested in limiting the supply of farm-
land. The pressure to break up and distribute common grazing land was 
intense between 1760 and 1808, but after this date the expansion of cultiva-
tion had assumed major proportions because of the political weakness of 
those who had previously opposed it. The legal basis of this reclamation 
was the decree of the Cortes of Cadiz in 4 January 1813, restored in 1820, 
which ordered the sale of half the public lands and the allocation of land to 
43.  La Hoya de Mostar, of 540 cubic meters, was the largest clay pond that Spain had, 
according to A. llauraDó, 1878, p. 158. Some other references point to 1820 irrigation-ditch 
enlargement plans and projects in Fitero (Labatores), in 1822 in Tudela (Mosquera), in 1825 
in Cadreita, Arguedas and Valtierra (yanguas y MiranDa, J., 1828).
44.  Remedies for cereal diseases through seed treatment, inspired by the experiences of 
French agronomist Tillet, had already been presented to Kingdom authorities in 1766 (AGN, 
Reino, Agricultura y Artes, legajo 2, carpeta 8), but they became more numerous between 
1812 and 1818 (ibidem, legajo 2, carpeta 47; legajo 3, carpeta 7; legajo 3, carpeta 23).
45.  casas, N., 1845, p. 75; Blanco, A., 1857, p. 197-198; HolliDay, R., 1960.
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peasants. However, much of the expansion of cultivation in these years was 
done spontaneously and on the margins of legality 46.
The second area of institutional change focused on taxation in two 
ways. First, since 1808 the peasantry stopped paying in full and on time 
tithes and seigneurial taxes. Some years the payment was totally or par-
tially suspended, and year after year the arrears were accumulated. These 
taxes collected by the church and the feudal lords were inally abolished in 
the 1840’s, but many lords claimed in court the payment of these arrears. 
Second, because of increasing iscal pressure from the army and the gov-
ernment, municipalities began to require the clergy and nobility, hitherto 
exempt, to pay taxes. The establishment of a new tax system in 1845 to 
conirm these changes was in part driven from below 47.
In the case of large landowners, many of them farmers using hired 
labour, there were two other factors. The irst relates to the unity of the 
national market, particularly important in the case of Navarre, which had 
maintained its customs duties on the frontier with Castile and Aragon and 
kept its own foreign trade policy. For large farms in the valley of the Ebro, 
which traded wheat, wine, and oil at prices that were steadily declining, 
integration into the Spanish market by shifting the customs barrier to the 
Pyrenees had become a crucial issue. After arduous political debates in the 
parliament of Navarre in 1818 and 1828, and a temporary abolition of du-
ties from 1820 to 1823, the transfer of customs to the border with France 
took place legally in 1841 48.
The second factor relates to the full and free disposition of a land-
owner’s property, a case involving, on the one hand, the rights of use by 
third parties (servidumbres) and, on the other, the impediments to selling, 
exchanging, and dividing farms (mayorazgos). The decree of the Cortes 
46.  lloPis, E., 2002, p. 178-180. In Monteagudo in 1812 and 1820, the Marquis de San-
Adrian demanded compensation for several plots that the villagers had broken up and distrib-
uted without the lord‘s permission. In 1822 an agreement was reached whereby the farmers 
would enjoy this land for 25 years without paying any rent, and that after 1848 they would 
pay a ixed fee of 1.57 hectolitres of wheat per hectare. In 1825, the administrator warned that 
many peasants had added small strips of land to the parcels they had been assigned, and he 
advised leaving it that way (AMSA, box 20, 1). See also J.-M. usunariz, 2004.
47.  canales, E., 1982; coMín, F., 1991, p. 72-74. The Marquis of San Adrián did not 
collect taxes (pechas) in San Adrian manor in 1814 and 1815, between 1820 and 1826, and 
inally after 1833. The municipality argued that he could refuse to pay because the taxes were 
feudal origin. At the same time, the village seized wheat from his barn in 1820, and again in 
1828, to cover contributions to the payment he had resisted (AMSA, box 1, 5; box 22, 8).
48.  Del río, R., 1985; 1987, p. 123-133.
Histoire & Mesure, 2011, XXVI-1
98
of Cadiz on 8 June 1813 (acotamientos) addressed the irst issue, while 
the second was the object of the law of disendowment (desvinculación) 
of 27 September 1820 (both restored in 1836). The repeal of these laws in 
1823 did not prevent property belonging to mayorazgos going on sale on 
the market, as seen in Table 4 49. 
Table 4. The land market as recorded in Mortgage Books of Tudela, 
according to sale modality (data expressed in hectares)
Free sales Censo 
reservativo 
Desvinculación Desamortización Total Mobility 
Rate 
Ha. % Ha % Ha. % Ha. % Ha. %
1816-1820 14.12 43 10.77 33 7.84 24 0.00 0 32.73 0.23
1821-1825 66.03 66 4.09 4 29.85 30 0.00 0 99.97 0.71
1826-1830 54.95 56 1.42 1 41.31 42 0.00 0 97.68 0.69
1831-1835 68.37 86 10.76 13 0.61 1 0.00 0 79.74 0.56
1836-1840 46.57 46 4.94 5 11.39 11 37.83 38 100.73 0.71
1841-1845 93.34 36 30.37 12 66.07 26 67.88 26 257.66 1.82
Notes. Censo reservativo is a inanced sales modality where the purchaser retained the 
whole or a fraction of the purchase price, paying in exchange a ixed annual rent in 
money. Desvinculación refers to the sale of noble properties subject to primogeniture. 
Desamortización consists in the nationalization and sale by the state of the properties 
of the Catholic Church. The mobility rate is calculated on 2,834 arable lands in Tudela.
Source. AGN, Contaduría de Hipotecas, books 243-253 and 231. 
The mobility rate is calculated on 2,834 arable lands in Tudela. 
The ability to sell properties subject to primogeniture allowed not only 
repayment of debts but also streamlining and adding to inheritance through 
acquisition of other properties. On several occasions when the state decreed 
the nationalization and sale of church estates (1798, 1810, 1820, 1836) 
these lands became the best way to create viable economic units, because 
they were located in more fertile soil. At this time however, church property 
was sold not only on state initiative, but often because ecclesiastical bodies 
49.  José Joaquín Fernández de Villavicencio, Count of Villarrea, and Jose Maria Magal-
lon, Marquis of San Adrian, sold some properties (23.55 hectares the irst one, and 15.95 hec-
tares the second) to the Theological Seminary of Tudela. They were forced to reinvest the 
acquired amount (144,632 reales in the irst case and 181,102 reales in the second) in entailed 
estate improvements (AGN, Contaduría de Hipotecas, vol. 248).
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themselves had to sell and had been given the legal right to do so because 
of the inancial dificulties caused by war 50.
All this resulted in signiicant mobility in the land market, increasing 
the rate of mobility in the area of Tudela from less than 0.25 per cent in the 
period 1816-1820 to 0.70 per cent in the 1820s, and up to 1.82 per cent in 
the 1840s. The social groups that participated more actively in those markets 
as land purchasers were landowners and traders, well-situated to reinvest 
their earnings and attracted by the proitability of leasing land, and peasants 
(who acquired 32 per cent of the land sold and accounted for 23 per cent of 
its value), who found land a means of stabilizing their position 51. 
Institutional change in Spain took several decades to complete. It was 
not until the period 1834-1843 that the changes announced by the Cortes of 
Cádiz between 1810 and 1813 inally came about. The restoration of abso-
lutism in 1814 and again in 1823 ended the irst attempts to establish a new 
institutional order. The three main legislative measures, that is to say aboli-
tion of the seigneurial regime, liberalisation of primogeniture inheritance 
(desvinculación), and coniscation of church property (desamortización), 
were only implemented after 1836. That is when mobility in land on the 
market was more intense. It was also at that time that it was determined 
which social groups would deine property rights 52. But institutional change 
was not only a top-down movement, and was not limited to these three 
laws. From 1815 to 1830, a host of local clashes called into question the 
institutional framework of the Ancien Régime. With liberalisation of the 
market and the establishment of a national market, which moved Navarrean 
customs from the Ebro to the Pyrenees, the foundations were laid for a new 
model allowing a fresh cycle of growth from the 1840s onwards.
*
The aim of this paper was to identify the common traits and local pecu-
liarities of the widespread economic crisis that was unleashed after the end 
of Napoleonic Wars. We reviewed the proposed explanations for the crisis 
50.  In 1815 and again in 1823, some monasteries, once powerful, tried being active 
again after years of war. Given their inancial hardship they had no choice but to sell part of 
its assets to obtain cash. La Oliva Monastery, between 1814 and 1815, sold rural and urban 
estates valued at 420,465 reales (AGN, Clero, La Oliva, vol. 533) and at the same time, the 
monastery of Fitero sold farms valued in 100,523 reales (AGN, Clero, Fitero, vol. 458).
51.  lana-Berasain, J.-M & De la torre, J., 2011.
52.  garcía-sanz, a., 1985; congost, r., 2006; roBleDo, R., 1993, p. 48-53.
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and support an eclectic interpretation which assigns the main role to factors 
related to the supply of agricultural products, although it does not exclude 
the supplementary effect of other forces related to demand, relative cost of 
transportation, or to the monetary supply. The latter probably explains the 
long duration of delation in Spain; while in other countries there is evi-
dence of a price recovery starting in 1826 Spain had to wait for a civil war, 
which occurred eight years later.
In the second part of this paper the effect of price delation on the ag-
ricultural sector has been assessed. To accomplish this, the movement of 
some key items was contrasted against the general evolution of production 
costs: a farm labourer’s day’s pay, rent price for a yoke of mules, land rent 
in kind, and the interest rate for money. There is proof that farm proits fell 
because the price of produce declined while production costs remained more 
inlexible. Through a simulation exercise, we provided evidence that the ef-
fects were more harmful for large and medium sized holdings using wage la-
bour, than for small farms, which were able to use only family labour. From 
this evidence, we reviewed the three main options available to farmers: (1) 
modiication of management strategy, partial or full abandonment of direct 
farming, and transfer of the adjustment cost to family farming; (2) adoption 
of innovations intended to increase productivity (either in physical terms or 
increasing the land’s value, saving the land or working it more intensively); 
and inally (3) the transformation of the institutional framework through ref-
ormation measures included in the liberal revolution manifesto, i.e. liberali-
sation of the land (desamortización, desvinculación) and the emergence of a 
national market. In the case of Navarre the irst option was widely adopted, 
even though it did not mean the complete abandonment of commercial ag-
riculture at the expense of subsistence farming. The second option was less 
popular, but it is almost certain that a signiicant increase in productivity 
occurred 53. Nevertheless, it was the third option which in the end was more 
important. It was part of a broader process of political change, but it only 
inally consolidated at the end of the period considered here.




Rvn. reales de vellón
Hl.  hectoliter
Ha.  hectare
Qm  metric quintal
AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional
AGN Archivo General de Navarra
AMSA  Archivo de los Marqueses de San Adrián
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